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THE SECRETARY’S EMAILS: THE INTERSECTION OF
TRANSPARENCY, SECURITY, AND TECHNOLOGY
Joshua Jacobson*
Abstract
Transparency laws are designed to inform the public of government
workings and to hold government officials accountable to the people. The
emergence of email has amplified the government’s communicative
abilities and simultaneously created major challenges for records
management. These challenges were put on full display when it was
revealed that Hillary Clinton exclusively used a private email address and
server for government business while serving as Secretary of State. The
email arrangement Clinton used was permissible under the law at that
time, and despite recent changes, government employees may still use
private email for non-classified correspondence so long as the messages
are copied or forwarded to an official government account.
This Note argues that the present system fails to retain a significant
number of government records and puts government email records at risk.
Requiring government employees to oversee their own emails results in
a conflict of interest. Additionally, records housed on private servers may
have inadequate security protections and thus be at risk to hackers. A
paradigm shift is needed to ensure that the ever-expanding number of
digital communications are preserved and protected.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 2, 2015, the New York Times reported that Hillary Clinton
had exclusively used a private email address and server during her time
as Secretary of State.1 The ensuing controversy dominated newspaper
headlines for months and led some to call for criminal prosecution.2
While Clinton responded by turning over thousands of emails, her staff
deleted 31,000 emails that it deemed personal.3

1. Michael S. Schmidt, Hillary Clinton Used Personal Email Account at State Dept.,
Possibly Breaking Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/pol
itics/hillary-clintons-use-of-private-email-at-state-department-raises-flags.html.
2. See, e.g., Sen. Chuck Grassley: Hillary Could Be Charged in Email Case, NEWSMAX
(Mar. 31, 2015, 6:47 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/charles-grassley-hillary-clintonprivate-email/2015/03/31/id/635635/.
3. Michael S. Schmidt, Justice Dept. Says Hillary Clinton Had Authority to Delete Certain
Emails, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/us/justice-dept-sayshillary-clinton-had-authority-to-delete-certain-emails.html.
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Strictly speaking, it appears that Clinton’s email setup complied with
the letter of the law4—albeit probably not the spirit.5 While Clinton was
Secretary of State, the law permitted private email use for
communications involving government business and did not require that
government employees transfer official emails on private accounts to
government servers.6
This Note does not suggest that Clinton’s private email practices were
better or worse than those of other government officials. To be sure,
Clinton was not the first Secretary of State to use a private email address
for government business. Colin Powell relied on a personal email account
for communications with “American officials and ambassadors and
foreign leaders” during his term as Secretary of State.7 A recent
investigation discovered classified information in some of those emails.8
Furthermore, a recent survey suggests that many government employees
use private email accounts for business.9
4. Id. This is not to say that Clinton complied with the law if she knowingly, or with gross
negligence, sent emails containing classified information on a private server. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 793(f) (2012); Laurie L. Levenson, Clinton’s Email: Unwise, But Likely Not Criminal, NAT’L
L.J., Sept. 21, 2015, LEXIS. Another potentially applicable statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1924, which
prohibits removing classified documents “with the intent to retain such documents or materials at
an unauthorized location.” After an investigation, FBI Director James Comey recommended not
prosecuting Clinton, concluding that “no reasonable prosecutor” would bring charges. Press Release,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement by FBI Director James B. Comey on the Investigation of
Secretary Hillary Clinton’s Use of a Personal E-Mail System (July 5, 2016),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/statement-by-fbi-director-james-b-comey-on-theinvestigation-of-secretary-hillary-clinton2019s-use-of-a-personal-e-mail-system. Notwithstanding
the FBI’s recommendation, Comey admonished Clinton’s “extremely reckless” email practices.
Id.
5. See Transparency and Open Government, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), in 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“Transparency
promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about what their Government is
doing.”). Preserving official emails on a private server also deviated from guidelines set forth in
the National Archives and Records Administration Bulletin suggesting that emails be preserved
in a manner that would “[p]ermit easy and timely retrieval.” NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.,
NARA BULL. NO. 2008-05, GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE USE OF E-MAIL ARCHIVING
APPLICATIONS
TO
STORE
E-MAIL
(2008),
https://www.archives.gov/recordsmgmt/bulletins/2008/2008-05.html, superseded by NARA BULL. NO. 2011-03 (2010),
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2011/2011-03.html.
6. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
7. Josh Gerstein & Tarini Parti, Colin Powell Relied on Personal Emails While Secretary
of State, POLITICO (Mar. 3, 2015, 2:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/colin-powellpersonal-email-secretary-of-state-115707.
8. Ken Dilanian, Rice Aides, Powell Also Got Classified Info on Personal Emails, MSNBC
(Feb. 4, 2016, 2:01 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/rice-aides-powell-also-got-classifiedinfo-personal-emails.
9. Sharyl Attkisson, High-Ranking Federal Officials’ History of Using Personal Email for
Government Business, DAILY SIGNAL (Mar. 8, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/03/08/high-
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Regardless, Clinton’s practices exposed a gaping hole in transparency
laws in the United States: government officials could conduct their
official duties from a private email account and personally retain their
email records until someone made a formal request. This gap allowed
Clinton’s staff—instead of independent State Department employees—
to decide for itself what should be disclosed when a formal records
request was made.10
Government employees using their private email accounts for
business is inherently troubling. By communicating outside proper
channels, government employees undermine public and institutional
oversight and create an incomplete historical record.11 Furthermore, the
practice leaves potentially sensitive information vulnerable to hackers.12
Recent amendments to transparency laws sought to bring more
records under direct government control,13 but the fox is still guarding the
hen house. Public officials are charged with preserving their own emails
for later public inspection. Allowing officials to monitor themselves
creates the obvious problem that they will selectively choose which
records to preserve, neglecting to preserve records that might hurt their
interests if made public.14
Moreover, the media’s intense scrutiny of Clinton’s email revealed
the significant shortcomings of the State Department’s information
technology (IT) systems, as well as other governmental IT systems.15
Today, many government employees use private email because using
their official government email is inconvenient and inefficient.16 Further,
numerous hacks against government agencies have also undermined
public confidence in government IT.
ranking-federal-officials-history-using-personal-email-government-business/ (noting that thirtythree percent of the survey respondents said they “use personal email for government business at
least sometimes”); Brody Mullins, Survey: Many Government Employees Use Personal Email for
Work, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Sept. 1, 2015, 4:19 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/
09/01/survey-many-government-employees-use-personal-email-for-work/ (discussing a similar
survey in which “about 33% of [respondents] said they used their personal accounts for work
email at least occasionally”).
10. See Schmidt, supra note 3.
11. See infra Section III.A.
12. See, e.g., Byron Tau, Hillary Clinton’s Private Email Server Was Subject to Attempted
Attacks, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-clintons-private-email-server-wassubject-to-attempted-attacks-1444323907 (last updated Oct. 9, 2015, 10:36 AM).
13. See Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-187,
128 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
14. See infra notes 113–156 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Section IV.C.
16. Clay Johnson, Hillary’s Email, MEDIUM (Mar. 3, 2015), https://medium.com/@cjoh/
hillary-s-email-858ccfc48277#.ka72t7uwj.
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If the status quo remains, inadequate regulation will continue to
hamstring government transparency and record keeping. This Note
analyzes the current regulatory scheme and proposes a solution to ensure
more exacting email retention and secure email regulation. Part I explores
the purposes of transparency laws. Part II outlines the laws currently
governing creation, retention, and disclosure of government records—
with an emphasis on email records. Part III explains how the current
email retention framework fails to address the security and conflict-ofinterest issues present and is thus inadequate. Finally, Part IV proposes a
two-pronged solution: a ban on private email use for government business
and increased government spending for IT.
I. PURPOSES OF TRANSPARENCY LAWS
Government transparency laws rest on the principle that citizens
should have access to information regarding their government’s
activities.17 Many rationales have been offered to justify transparency
laws. Among them are the public’s interest in monitoring government
actors, providing input and feedback to government entities, and having
a complete documentary record of governmental activity.18
One central purpose of government-transparency laws is to facilitate
public access to government information.19 An informed citizenry has
long been thought of as a check on excessive executive power. 20 In
theory, transparency allows the public to “monitor government activity
and hold officials, particularly incompetent and corrupt ones, accountable
for their actions.”21 Transparency may also improve governance by
facilitating review of and input on government actions by the public at
large.22
Another important reason for government record keeping is the
informational value of documenting government transactions, policies,

17. WENDY GINSBERG ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42817, GOVERNMENT
TRANSPARENCY AND SECRECY: AN EXAMINATION OF MEANING AND ITS USE IN THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH 1–2 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42817.pdf.
18. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 899–900 (2006).
19. About FOIA, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/open/foia (last updated Nov. 20,
2014).
20. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). But see Mark Fenster, Transparency in Search of a Theory, 18 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY
150 (2015) (arguing that the theory and assumptions underlying transparency’s benefits are
flawed).
21. Fenster, supra note 18, at 899.
22. Id. at 900.
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procedures, operations, and so on.23 Preserved historical records can thus
be examined and later used to understand past and present governmental
operations.24
The passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)25 capped off
a decade-long movement to enact legislation vesting private citizens with
access to government information.26 The FOIA’s enactment came despite
consistent executive branch opposition.27 This conflict illustrates the
tension between transparency objectives and legitimate security concerns
that follow the opening of the government’s files to the public.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
This Note focuses on the three transparency statutes regulating
government agencies and officials: the FOIA, the Federal Records Act
(FRA),28 and the Presidential Records Act (PRA).29 These statutes can be
understood as serving different and exclusive functions—regulating the
creation and retention of records on the one hand and regulating their
disclosure on the other.30 While the FOIA regulates disclosure
practices,31 it sets no record-keeping standards.32 Instead, the FRA and
PRA govern record-keeping practices, with each covering different types
23. WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43072, COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT
FEDERAL RECORDS
AND
RELATED
AGENCY
REQUIREMENTS
2,
5
(2015),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43072.pdf.
24. WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40238, THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT:
BACKGROUND AND RECENT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/
R40238.pdf.
25. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
26. See Thomas Blanton, Freedom of Information at 40, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (July 4,
2006), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/index.htm.
27. See id. When President Johnson signed the FOIA, he preemptively called for measured
use of the law with a signing statement cautioning against disclosure of military secrets and
investigative files, among other things. Statement by the President Upon Signing the “Freedom
of Information Act,” 1 PUB. PAPERS 316 (July 4, 1966). Executive officials were not the FOIA’s
only critics; then-Professor Antonin Scalia forcefully argued that the FOIA is fundamentally
flawed and that its costs vastly outweigh its benefits. See Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of
Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14, 16–19.
28. Federal Records Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-849, 64 Stat. 583 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
29. Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–09).
30. Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
31. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980)
(explaining that the FOIA ensures private access to certain government records).
32. See Armstrong, 721 F. Supp. at 345 (“FOIA . . . is a disclosure statute, and a disclosure
statute only; it imposes no obligations and provides no guidance for the creation or disposal of
particular records.”).
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of records created by different entities.33 Material governed by the FRA
and PRA is subject to the disclosure mechanisms of the FOIA.34
A. Record Disclosure: Freedom of Information Act
At its most basic level, the FOIA vests the public with the “right to
access information from the federal government.”35 The FOIA was only
necessary because the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently rejected the
notion that the First Amendment guarantees citizens a right to access
government information.36 In the absence of a constitutional right of
private citizens to access government information, the FOIA has supplied
that right.37
The FOIA’s legislative history is replete with references to Congress’s
desire to vindicate the public right to access information.38 And although
the Supreme Court has recognized a right to receive information,39 it has
“relied on FOIA, not the Constitution, to protect access to other
government information.”40 The FOIA thus serves as the primary vehicle
enabling the public to obtain information sought from the government.41
Section (a) of the FOIA generally requires that agencies make certain
information available to the public42 and disclose records in response to
requests.43 Section (b) enumerates nine classes of information exempt
from disclosure and provides procedures for redacting exempted material
from documents capable of partial disclosure.44 The exemptions protect
33. The FRA applies to “each Federal agency.” 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012). “[T]he term
‘Federal agency’ means any executive agency or any establishment in the legislative or judicial
branch of the Government” and does not mean the Supreme Court, Congress, or Architect of the
Capitol. Id. § 2901(14). The PRA, however, regulates “Presidential records,” defined as
“documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, created or received by the
President, [the President’s] immediate staff,” or someone advising or assisting the President. Id.
§ 2201(2).
34. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3), (f)(1).
35. See What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/ (last visited Sept. 30 , 2016).
36. See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013) (“This Court has repeatedly
made clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA
laws.”); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1978) (“Neither the First Amendment nor
the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of
information within the government’s control.”).
37. See Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and
the People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2012).
38. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 37–38 (1965).
39. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
40. Susan Nevelow Mart, Let the People Know the Facts: Can Government Information
Removed from the Internet Be Reclaimed?, 98 LAW LIBR. J. 7, 9 (2006).
41. See Sullivan, supra note 37, at 66.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
43. Id. § 552(a)(3).
44. Id. § 552(b).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 6

1448

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

from disclosure records containing, for example, classified information,
trade secrets, and personal information.45 The FOIA grants district courts
authority to enjoin government agencies “from withholding agency
records” and to order the production of improperly withheld records.46
The FOIA applies to “government agencies,” defined as any
department, government corporation, or other creation of the executive
branch.47 Unlike the term “government agency,” the FOIA does not
define “record,” although it makes clear that the FOIA covers
electronically stored information that would otherwise be a record.48
The Supreme Court has borrowed the definition of “agency record”
from other statutes to determine what records the FOIA covers.49 Records
can thus be described as “documentary materials . . . made or received by
an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in
connection with the transaction of public business.”50
Additionally, to be subject to the FOIA, requested materials must be
in the possession of the agency when the request is made.51 This
possession requirement was the subject of the landmark Supreme Court
case Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.52 The
Court in Kissinger held that courts may only intervene when “an agency
has (1) ‘improperly’; (2) ‘withheld’; (3) ‘agency records.’”53 When an
agency record is removed from the agency’s possession before a FOIA
request, the agency lacks the possession necessary to withhold the
record.54 This means that records removed from an agency’s control are
beyond FOIA’s grasp. This possession requirement evinces FOIA’s
narrow focus of providing access to records rather than directing their
creation or maintenance.55

45. Id.
46. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
47. Id. §§ 551(a), 552(f)(1). The FOIA regulations do not govern Congress, the courts, and
several other bodies. Id. § 551(a).
48. Id. § 552(f)(2)(A).
49. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 145 (1989); Forsham v. Harris,
445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980).
50. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added) (quoting 44 U.S.C. § 3301).
51. See Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145 (“[T]he agency must be in control of the requested
materials at the time the FOIA request is made. By control we mean that the materials have come
into the agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties.”).
52. 445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980) (“The [FOIA] does not obligate agencies to create or retain
documents; it only obligates them to provide access to those which it in fact has created and
retained.”).
53. Id. at 150 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)).
54. Id. at 150–51.
55. Id. at 152.
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B. Record Retention
Despite its foundational importance, the FOIA is not without its
limitations. Its reach is limited to records within an agency’s control.56
This limitation is, for the most part, mitigated by statutes mandating the
preservation of records. The FRA and the PRA are principally concerned
with the handling, creation, and preservation of government records and
information.57 These laws bolster the FOIA by ensuring the preservation
of records subject to disclosure.58
1. Federal Records Act
The FRA governs executive agencies’ creation, management, and
disposal of records.59 The FRA facilitates public access to records by
ensuring their retention so they may be available for subsequent FOIA
requests. After all, “proper records management is the backbone of open
Government.”60
Unlike the FOIA, the FRA explicitly defines “records.”61 The FRAprovided definition of records, like the definition the Supreme Court
attributed to the FOIA, is expansive.62 The 2014 FRA amendment shifted
the emphasis away from the medium in which the information was stored
to the information itself.63 Accordingly, the definition of agency record
refers “generically to ‘recorded information.’”64 Emails clearly fit this
broad category and are thus subject to preservation.65
For the purposes of this Note’s analysis, the 2014 FRA amendments’
treatment of email records is most relevant. Before the amendments, the
law required government employees to preserve email records, but it did
not require them to preserve the records in an official location—meaning
that officials such as Secretary Clinton were free to create and maintain
56. Id.
57. See Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 284–85 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
58. See Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D.D.C. 1989) (“Several federal statutes
combine to ensure the permanent retention and public disclosure of a broad variety of federal
‘records.’”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
59. The “Federal Records Act” refers to four U.S. Code chapters governing federal records:
(1) National Archives and Record Administration, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101–20 (2012); (2) Records
Management by the Archivist of the United States, §§ 2901–11; (3) Records Management by
Federal Agencies, §§ 3101–07; (4) Disposal of Records, §§ 3301–14.
60. Memorandum on Managing Government Records, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1
(Nov. 28, 2011).
61. See 44 U.S.C. § 3301.
62. See id.; Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980).
63. GINSBERG, supra note 23, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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email records entirely on private servers.66 The amended FRA requires
that agency officials copy or forward copies of records created or
received on an unofficial email account to an official government email
account.67 Under this subsection, employees are free to conduct official
business from private accounts so long as these messages make it to a
government email inbox within the allotted time frame.68
Government employees are not completely free, however, to send
confidential information on private email accounts. A number of laws
impose penalties for knowingly or negligently disclosing classified
material.69 Indeed, much of the Clinton controversy centered on whether
Clinton sent or received classified information on her private server.70
The FRA only mandates retention of records—non-records need not
be forwarded to a government email.71 For instance, emails relating to
professional meetings that do not document agency activity do not
constitute records.72 However, emails relating to both personal matters
and government business constitute records.73 Naturally, these
parameters create ambiguity as to which emails government employees
must forward.
Federal agency heads are tasked with ensuring FRA compliance.74
Agency chiefs “shall make and preserve records” documenting the
agency’s activities and must establish a records-management program.75
It is their responsibility to safeguard against the improper removal or
destruction of records and to report any discovered removal or destruction
of records.76 The FRA provides guidelines for the proper destruction of
agency records.77 Agency records may not be removed or destroyed by
other means.78 Intentional violators who fail to forward records created
66. See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Hillary Clinton’s Personal Email Use Came Before Recent
Rule Changes, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hillaryclintons-personal-email-use-came-before-recent-rule-changes-1425415233.
67. See 44 U.S.C. § 2911(a).
68. See id.
69. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(f), 1924(a).
70. Elizabeth Goitein, Five Myths About Classified Information, WASH. POST (Sept. 18,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-classified-information/2015
/09/18/a164c1a4-5d72-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64_story.html.
71. See 44 U.S.C. § 2911.
72. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. RECORDS MGMT., E-MAIL MANAGEMENT 8,
http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/toolkit/pdf/ID317.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
73. 36 C.F.R. § 1222.20(b)(2) (2015) (“If information about private matters and agency
business appears in a received document, the document is a Federal record.”).
74. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101–06.
75. Id. §§ 3101–02.
76. Id. § 3106.
77. Id. §§ 3301–16.
78. Id. § 3314.
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or received on a private email account are subject to non-criminal
punishment ranging from a week’s suspension to firing.79
2. Presidential Records Act
The PRA governs the creation, retention, and eventual archival or
destruction of records “created or received by the President, [the
President’s] immediate staff,” or other executive individuals working in
an official capacity for the executive branch.80 The PRA and the FRA
cover a mutually exclusive set of records but serve the same general
function.81 They each direct covered individuals to preserve certain
records created or received while conducting official business and
provide for specific disposal procedures.82
Critically, the PRA adopts the same procedures as the FRA for
preserving records created or received on an unofficial email address83:
Employees who send or receive an official record on an unofficial email
account must either copy or forward the email to an official email account
within twenty days.84 The disciplinary protocol the PRA establishes for
violators is identical to that of the FRA.85
C. Relationship Between Disclosure and Retention Statutes
The FRA and PRA govern the way government agencies and the
executive branch collect, preserve, and dispose of federal records.86 The
FOIA, on the other hand, provides a mechanism for accessing executive
branch and federal agency records.87 The FRA and PRA can thus properly
be viewed “as ensuring the proper collection and retention” of materials
to be later disclosed under the FOIA.88
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PERMISSION PARADIGM
As currently formulated, both the PRA and the FRA permit covered
employees to conduct official duties on private email addresses so long
as an official email account receives a copy of the record.89 Thus, covered
79. Id. § 2911(b). Even stiffer punishment may be imposed on a person found guilty of
“willfully and unlawfully” concealing, removing, or destroying a federal record. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2071(b). Violators face fines, up to three years imprisonment, or both. Id.
80. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–09.
81. Id. § 2201(2)(B) (noting that the statute does not cover “official records of an agency”).
82. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 284–86 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
83. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209, 2911.
84. Id. § 2209.
85. Id. §§ 2209(b), 2911(b).
86. See supra Section II.B.
87. See supra Section II.A.
88. GINSBERG, supra note 23, at 11.
89. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(b), 2911(b).
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officials retain discretion as to when private emails contain subject matter
that requires retention. This formulation creates perverse incentives for
government employees and is fraught with security risks. This Part will
analyze some of the inherent problems of a permission-with-regulation
regime.
A. Rule Breaking
Letting a government employee decide which emails to retain creates
a conflict of interest. The public has an interest in the most disclosure
practicable, while government employees have an interest in disclosure
that will not be personally damaging. The public and the government
employees’ record-keeping goals are therefore at odds.
1. A Useful Analogy: The Classification System
An illustrative example of government employees’ anti-disclosure
posture is the classification system. The classification system exists to
prevent disclosure of sensitive information that could injure national
security.90 It generally consists of rules and procedures that guide the
protection of government records containing sensitive or confidential
information.91 Despite the straightforward mandate of information
classification,92 it has long been recognized that the classification system
conceals a great deal of documents that could hardly be characterized as
injurious to national security if disclosed.93 For instance, intelligence
agencies labeled as “top secret” an email sent to Hillary Clinton that
included discussion on a “widely known and discussed” drone strike.94

90. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2012).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 402–04 (2009); Jeffrey Toobin, Hillary’s Problem: The Government
Classifies Everything, NEW YORKER (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/hillarys-problem-the-government-classifies-everything. In a 2010 hearing, National
Security Archive Director Thomas Blanton estimated that approximately fifty to ninety percent
of classified material should not be classified. Hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and
Constitutional Implications of Wikileaks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 160 (2010) (statement of Thomas Blanton, Director, National Security Archive),
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/20101216/Blanton101216.pdf.
94. Bradley Klapper & Ken Dilanian, AP EXCLUSIVE: Top Secret Clinton Emails Include
Drone Talk, AP: BIG STORY (Aug. 14, 2015, 9:32 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
b54a250a40e9410baaaca5f9fb58ea94/ap-exclusive-top-secret-clinton-emails-include-drone-talk
(“Neither of the two emails sent to Hillary Rodham Clinton now labeled by intelligence agencies
as ‘top secret’ contained information that would jump out to experts as particularly sensitive,
according to several government officials.”).
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For decades, commentators have lamented abuses of the classification
system and “excessive government secrecy.”95 Numerous task forces,
commissions, and committees have diagnosed government overclassification as a problem and suggested solutions.96 Few of these
initiatives, however, have significantly reduced the excesses of
government classification.97 In 2014, executive agencies completed over
seventy-seven million classification actions.98
The properties and structure of the classification system can partly
account for the over-classification problem. Critically, more than four
million government officials have authority to classify documents.99
Further, the categories under which government employees may classify
documents are so vague as to cover a broad range of documents that
would have no bearing on national security if released. 100 These reasons
alone, however, do not evince a clear rationale for why government
employees consistently err on the side of over-classification rather than
under-classification.101
Principal reasons for consistent over-classification have more to do
with the interests and motivations of the individuals participating in the
classification system than the structure of the system itself. One recent
article pointed to “bureaucratic secrecy”102 and “political secrecy”103 as
drivers of improper classification practices. Accounting for these
interests, over-classification has little to do with national security.104
Instead, some of the most prevalent factors include suspicion that
disclosure is inherently riskier than non-disclosure, convenience, desires
to avoid controversy and accountability, and political expediency.105
95. Aftergood, supra note 93, at 404.
96. Id. at 404–06.
97. See id.
98. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2014 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 5 (2014),
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2014-annual-report.pdf. Maintaining the classification
system cost roughly $14.98 billion in 2014. Id. at 24.
99. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 2014 REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE
DETERMINATIONS 5 tbl.1.3 (2015); Goitein, supra note 70.
100. Fenster, supra note 18, at 923 (noting the ease of fitting a “document’s information
within one of the broad and vague categories provided by the Executive Order establishing the
classification system”).
101. Id. at 923–24 (“Tellingly, the inadvertent release of classified documents is far rarer
than the inadvertent classification of information that does not warrant protection.”).
102. Aftergood, supra note 93, at 402 (noting the “tendency of bureaucracies . . . to hoard
information”).
103. Id. at 403 (“[Political secrecy] exploits the generally accepted legitimacy of genuine
national security interests in order to advance a self-serving agenda, to evade controversy, or to
thwart accountability.”).
104. See Goitein, supra note 70.
105. See Aftergood, supra note 93, at 402–03; Fenster, supra note 18, at 923.
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Taken together, classification policies and inherently biased classifiers
have produced a mass of uncertainty and excessive government secrecy.
The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)106
example illustrates these classification tendencies. Created by executive
order in 1995, the ISCAP is comprised of senior-level representatives of
the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Archives, and the National Security Council.107 The
Panel adjudicates appeals of agency decisions denying declassification
requests.108 Between 1996 and 2014, the Panel declassified some or all of
the requested documents in 1,387 of 1,960 appeals heard.109 To put this
in context, federal courts, which generally defer to executive decisions,
hear similar appeals but “almost never overturn agency classification
decisions.”110
Reconciling the success of the Panel with the fact that its members are
the very organizations whose decisions are being questioned requires
analysis of the Panel members’ interests. While political and bureaucratic
secrecy drive over-classification within agencies, those unique
organizational interests are not persuasive to the Panel as a whole.111
Instead, the Panel members’ joint interest in national security guides
decisions whether to declassify, and the Panel overturns classification
decisions based on illegitimate factors.112
It is likely that the factors contributing to over-classification of
government records would similarly cause abuses of the FRA and the
PRA’s guidelines for private email retention. As a preliminary matter, the
government employees making classification decisions are the same
individuals governed by records-retention laws. They are demonstrably
risk-averse and generally err on the side of self-preservation through
over-classification.113 Thus, a government employee who classifies
records unnecessarily in the interest of self-preservation would likely
neglect to forward potentially damaging emails sent or received on a
private email address even if the email was an official record. That is, a
government employee forced to choose114 whether an email is an official
106. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 352–53 (1996), reprinted as amended in 50
U.S.C. § 435 (2012).
107. Id. The represented agencies are among “the most prolific classifiers.” Aftergood, supra
note 93, at 407.
108. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298, 319–20 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435.
109. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 98, at 22.
110. Aftergood, supra note 93, at 407 (noting that courts have overturned agency
classification decisions in “no more than a few dozen FOIA cases over the past thirty years”).
111. Id. at 408–09.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 402–03; Fenster, supra note 18, at 923.
114. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text.
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record would more often than not neglect to preserve it on an official
email account, regardless of whether it is actually an official record.115
Without modification to the law, such individuals will retain only emails
that pose no threat to their interests.
It should be noted, however, that this is an imperfect analogy. Overclassification is a problem, but the generous classification decisions
themselves are not illegal because of the vague classification categories
that make the system susceptible to abuse.116 On the other hand, failing
to copy or forward potentially damaging emails covered by the PRA or
the FRA to an official email account is illegal.117 This distinction between
rule bending and rule breaking is important to note in predicting the
observance of the current email-retention scheme. However, the same
interests remain prevalent and would likely cause a significant number of
emails to elude preservation.
2. Classification’s Impact on Email
Government email regulation is more than just analogous to the
classification system—the two systems are highly intertwined. Agency
rules mandate that government employees must transmit classified
information only via classified networks.118 Sending classified
information on a network the agency has not approved to handle
classified messages may result in criminal sanctions or a security
violation.119
Given the documented abuse of the classification system, the
government’s stance against transmission of classified information on
unsecure networks is at odds with its current allowance for official emails
on private accounts. The Clinton email controversy speaks directly to this
issue. Ever since Clinton’s emails were made public, the State
Department has engaged in a public disagreement with intelligence
agencies and Congress over whether and when the emails on Clinton’s
server were classified.120 This disagreement begs the question: If
government agencies cannot agree on what information belongs on a
115. See Aftergood, supra note 93, at 402–04; Fenster, supra note 18, at 923.
116. See Fenster, supra note 18, at 923.
117. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(b), 2911(b) (2012).
118. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Army, Regulation 380-5, Information Security Program § 8, at
90–91 (Sept. 29, 2000), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar380-5.pdf.
119. See id.; supra note 4.
120. See Eric Lichtblau & Stevn Lee Myers, Agencies Clashed on Classification of Clinton
Email,
Inquiry
Shows,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
17,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/us/politics/hillary-clinton-emails-fbi.html; Steven Lee
Myers & Mark Mazzetti, Agencies Battle over What Is ‘Top Secret’ in
Hillary Clinton’s Emails, N.Y.TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/06/us/pol
itics/agencies-battle-over-what-is-top-secret-in-hillary-clintons-emails.html.
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secure government server, is it reasonable to expect individual
government employees to make this determination correctly?
Because the classification system involves a great deal of uncertainty
as to what is and is not classified, email regulations should not distinguish
between classified and unclassified content. Allowing official emails on
private email accounts creates additional uncertainty and renders
government employees vulnerable to allegations of mishandling
classified information because of flexible classification parameters.121
3. Undermining the Objectives of Transparency Laws
Non-compliance with the PRA and the FRA’s email guidelines
prevents those statutes from achieving their purpose. The public cannot
effectively monitor the government when many government emails can
easily be kept out of reach.122 An incomplete record limits public review
and criticism of government activities and reduces the “informational
value” of available government documents.123 Since governmental
entities do not possess records that government employees fail to copy to
an official email address, the FOIA would be circumvented as to the
unforwarded records.124
While the classification system doubtless serves an important
function, excessive use of classification hinders the objectives advanced
by transparency laws.125 And just as an agency official with classification
authority can shield information from public scrutiny, any government
official who transacts official business on a private email address can
similarly keep the substance of his emails secret by neglecting to
forward.126
However, even when a government official complies with the PRA
and the FRA’s email mandates by copying official emails to government
email addresses,127 accessing these emails after the fact may be
impractical if they are not all forwarded to the same email address.128
FOIA requests often require officials to search thousands of records to
121. See Fenster, supra note 18, at 923; Toobin, supra note 93.
122. See supra Part I.
123. See id.
124. See supra Section II.A.
125. Alexander M. Taber, Note, Information Control: Making Secrets and Keeping Them
Safe, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 581, 594–95 (2015).
126. See supra Section III.A.
127. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(a), 2911(a) (2012).
128. See, e.g., NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., NARA BULL. NO. 2011-03, GUIDANCE
CONCERNING THE USE OF E-MAIL ARCHIVING APPLICATIONS TO STORE E-MAIL (2010),
http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2011/2011-03.html (requiring email recordkeeping systems that facilitate the “grouping of related records” and “[p]ermit easy and timely
retrieval” of records).
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find responsive documents,129 and when the email records are preserved
in tens or hundreds of different email inboxes, fulfilling a FOIA request
becomes impractical.130 Therefore, even compliance with recordsretention statutes may circumvent the FOIA.
B. Security
Allowing government employees to conduct official business from
private email accounts on private servers results in inconsistent—and
probably insufficient—security of potentially sensitive information. The
prevalence of hacking has created an environment where digital
information is less secure than ever. In such a threat-ridden online world,
allowing individual employees to take email security into their own hands
is a risky endeavor.
Hackers and other nefarious parties threaten the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of email—the primary form of communication
for many.131 Some of the most significant recent hacks originated via
email.132 Two notable tactics hackers use to perpetrate cyber attacks are
spear phishing and social engineering. Spear phishing is the process by
which hackers send seemingly personal emails to their target utilizing
publicly available personal information in a bid to convince the target to
disclose valuable information.133 In the hacking context, social
engineering is “the art of manipulating people so they give up
confidential information.”134
129. See What Is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Why Should You Care?, NAT’L
TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/about/foia/Pages/freedom_and_information.aspx
(last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
130. Lauren Carroll, Hillary Clinton’s Email: Did She Follow All the Rules?, POLITIFACT
(Mar. 12, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2015/mar/12/hillaryclintons-email-did-she-follow-all-rules/.
131. PAM COCCA, SANS INST., EMAIL SECURITY THREATS 3 (2005), https://www.sans.org/
reading-room/whitepapers/email/email-security-threats-1540; RADICATI GRP., INC., US EMAIL
STATISTICS REPORT, 2016-2020, at 2–3 (2016), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/US-Email-Statistics-Report-2016-2020-Executive-Summary.pdf.
132. See Richard Chirgwin, Ubiquiti Stung US$46.7 Million in E-mail Spoofing Fraud, THE
REGISTER (Aug. 9, 2015, 10:44 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/09/ubiquiti_stung_
by_email_spoofing_fraud/; Gerry Smith, Massive Target Hack Traced Back to Phishing Email,
HUFFPOST BUS. (Feb. 12, 2014, 3:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/12/targethack_n_4775640.html.
133. Spear Phishers Angling to Steal Your Financial Info, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION
(Apr. 1, 2009), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/april/spearphishing_040109.
134. Social Engineering: A Hacking Story, INFOSEC INST. (Sept. 23, 2013),
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/social-engineering-a-hacking-story/. Social engineering
attacks can target individuals or service providers. For the purposes of this Note, attacks against
service providers are most relevant because attacks seeking information directly from the targeted
individual are possible regardless of the entity servicing the email account.
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While serving as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s private email
was reportedly subjected to at least five phishing attempts.135 The attacks
were apparently not successful, but they underscore the risk that a
careless click could have caused a leak of sensitive information.136 Some
have suggested that Clinton’s email setup was especially vulnerable to
hacks because it was independently maintained by Clinton and her staff
and unprotected by State Department security staff—or even by security
measures offered by private email providers like Microsoft or Yahoo.137
Email accounts maintained on independent servers are not the only
accounts at risk. Personal email accounts hosted by Internet companies
are also targeted. The recent hack of CIA Director John O. Brennan’s
private email account provides an example of the risks created when
government officials conduct business on a personal email account
hosted by Internet companies.138 In a recent address to the Council on
Foreign Relations, Brennan touted the CIA’s efforts to improve cyber
defenses.139 Yet, months later, a hacker—allegedly a high school
student—breached Brennan’s personal email account140 and went on to
release sensitive documents that Brennan had in his personal email
account’s inbox.141 The hacker claims to have used “social engineering”
to pose as Brennan and acquire his personal information and email
credentials from Verizon and AOL.142 The hack on Brennan’s AOL
135. Bradley Klapper et al., Emails: Russia-Linked Hackers Tried to Access Clinton Server,
AP: BIG STORY (Oct. 1, 2015, 2:51 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9160a25f39e14507ab90c9
77d300dc8b/6000-more-pages-clinton-emails-be-published-wednesday. The malicious emails
were disguised as speeding tickets from New York Department of Motor Vehicles. Id.
Downloading the “attachment would have allowed hackers to take over control of [Clinton’s]
computer.” Id.
136. See id.
137. Andy Greenberg, Why Clinton’s Private Email Server Was Such a Security Fail,
WIRED (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:32 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/clintons-email-servervulnerable/.
138. Phillip Messing et al., Teen Says He Hacked CIA Director’s AOL Account, N.Y. POST
(Oct. 18, 2015, 11:40 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/10/18/stoner-high-school-student-says-hehacked-the-cia/.
139. Director Brennan Speaks at the Council on Foreign Relations, CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2015speeches-testimony/director-brennan-speaks-at-the-council-on-foreign-relations.html.
140. Messing et al., supra note 138.
141. Damian Paletta, CIA Director’s Personal Email Allegedly Hacked, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
19, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-directors-personal-email-allegedly-hacked1445290540. The hacker released a contact list containing 2,611 email and instant-message
addresses, including contacts of CIA employees and top intelligence officials. Id. The hacker also
accessed Brennan’s application for top-secret security clearance, among other sensitive files. Id.
142. Kim Zetter, Teen Who Hacked CIA Director’s Email Tells How He Did It, WIRED
(Oct. 19, 2015, 6:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/hacker-who-broke-into-cia-directorjohn-brennan-email-tells-how-he-did-it/.
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account showed that even those individuals who are keenly aware of the
dangers posed by cyber threats are nonetheless susceptible to attacks
when they use personal email accounts.
As long as government officials transmit valuable information online,
malicious actors will seek to steal it. This eminent threat requires that
digital messages be protected with the most secure systems available. The
types of attacks faced by Clinton’s and Brennan’s personal email
accounts are commonplace today.143 Allowing government officials to
transmit official government records on private email accounts has the
obvious effect of putting these records at unnecessary risk.
IV. A SOLUTION: PROHIBITION
This Note argues that the best way to solve the security and conflictof-interest problems discussed above is to prohibit government officials
from conducting official business on private email accounts. This
prohibition will limit their ability to sidestep records-retention laws,
thereby advancing transparency laws’ objectives. Further, sensitive
information contained in official records would be more secure on official
email accounts. This ban is also necessary to prevent rampant violations
of regulations governing classified information. This solution, of course,
is not perfect, as some rule breaking and security breaches are inevitable;
however, prohibiting the use of private email accounts will significantly
improve record preservation and security.
To facilitate the prohibition of official business on private email
addresses, government IT capabilities must also be improved. Substantial
investment in IT would serve to enhance the security and convenience of
using government email accounts.
A. Reducing Rule Breaking
Prohibiting the use of private email accounts for official business
would minimize the risk of rule breaking that is all too likely under the
current permission-with-regulation paradigm.144 This Note’s solution
would modify the incentives of retention-law compliance by raising the
cost of non-compliance and making compliance a more attractive option.
Further, policing prohibition would be more straightforward than
policing a permission-with-regulation scheme. Finally, this Note’s
solution will induce officials who nonetheless break the rules and conduct
official business on private email accounts to break the rules to a lesser
extent.

143. Cyber Crime, FBI.gov, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber (last visited Sept. 30,
2016).
144. See supra Section III.A.
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1. Balancing Incentives
Basic economic principles illustrate why prohibition would deter
government officials from using private email accounts for official
business. Legal economists generally view decisions to engage in
criminal behavior as rational decisions made by individuals who expect
the benefit of the activity to exceed the cost.145 Thus, criminal behavior
may be reduced by increasing the cost of the behavior to a level exceeding
the benefit—ensuring that crime does not pay.
Basic economic theory presupposes that individuals are rational and
self-interested.146 Put simply, considerations of costs and benefits
guide—either implicitly or explicitly—the choices people make.147
Accordingly, researchers have observed that individuals generally
engage in more of an activity when the perceived benefits increase and
engage in less of an activity when the perceived costs increase.148
Criminal law utilizes these same principles to eliminate socially
undesirable activities by making the commission of crimes more
costly.149 Two factors relevant to an individual’s decision whether to
engage in criminal behavior are the probability of prosecution and the
severity of punishment.150 Accounting for these factors, two options
emerge that would appear to reduce the undesirable conduct: (1)
increasing the probability of prosecution, and (2) increasing the penalties
levied against offenders.151
Of the available options, increasing the probability of prosecution
would likely have the most significant effect on reducing the undesirable
activity—here, transmission of official government emails on private
accounts. Studies suggest that probability of enforcement has a far greater
deterrent effect than severity of punishment.152 The deterrent effect of
increasing penalties diminishes “rapidly” as the probability of
145. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219 (6th ed. 2003). While
transmitting official government emails on a private email account is not currently illegal,
adopting this Note’s proposed solution to consider such conduct illegal would substantially reduce
levels of rule breaking.
146. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 54–55 (2007).
147. POSNER, supra note 145, at 219.
148. Id. at 220; Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 43, 55 (1996).
149. POSNER, supra note 145, at 219–20.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 220–21. To be sure, opportunity costs also affect an individual’s behavior. Id.
at 220. Raising the costs of transmitting official emails on a private server would make alternatives
like phone calls and in-person meetings a more desirable alternative for individuals seeking to
avoid the message’s disclosure. See Fenster, supra note 18, at 922.
152. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U.
L. REV. 655, 660 (2006).
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enforcement falls.153 Increasing the probability of enforcement also
facilitates a more accurate perception of the costs and benefits of a crime,
such that would-be criminals are less likely to over- or underestimate the
risks of criminal activity.154
With these principles in mind, it should be obvious that materially
limiting the use of private email accounts for government business must
involve more than an increase in penalties—though some level of penalty
increase would probably be beneficial. However, any attempt to improve
email-record retention should seek to facilitate detection and make
enforcement of the rule more likely.
In addition to making rule breaking more costly by raising the
likelihood of detection and penalties, stigma effects of punishment could
further reduce the utility of improper email use.155 In the context of highranking government officials, the Hillary Clinton event should serve as a
strong incentive to keep official emails on government servers. However,
the same incentive is weaker—at least relative to that of higher ranking
officials—for low- and mid-level government employees who lack
political capital but are nonetheless subject to records-retention laws.
Nonetheless, criminalizing the activity would raise the costs of the
undesired activity and incentivize compliance with records-retention
laws.
This Note suggests implementing the prohibition of official emails on
private accounts by removing the provisions that shield government
employees from liability if they copy or forward the message to an
official account.156 Penalty for violation would be the same as is currently
contemplated for failure to copy or forward official emails on private
accounts.157
The current incentives for officials to use an official government email
account are low,158 and disobeying the rules is pervasive159 and relatively
risk-free.160 Penalizing the transmission of official emails on private
153. Id.
154. POSNER, supra note 145, at 227.
155. HARRISON, supra note 146, at 243.
156. For the FRA, this would mean eliminating 44 U.S.C. § 2911(a)(1)–(2), while leaving
subsection (a) intact before the word “unless.” For the PRA, the change would be the same, but §
2209(a) would be affected. These modified provisions would attach liability to senders of official
emails from private email accounts. Of course, liability would be inappropriate for the official
that receives an unsolicited official email on a private account.
157. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(b), 2911(b) (2012).
158. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 16 (arguing that private email servers are more secure
and efficient than government servers).
159. See sources cited supra note 9.
160. Hillary Clinton’s private email setup may have never been noticed were it not for a
special congressional investigation that failed to uncover any of Clinton’s emails from the State
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accounts is needed to curtail the rampant rule breaking and create more
meaningful transparency.
2. Simplifying Enforcement
Policing a prohibition scheme is more manageable than policing a
permission-with-regulation scheme and would better enable detection of
violations. First, evidence that a government official failed to use—or
barely used—an official email address almost certainly establishes a rule
violation. Proof of an email pertaining to government business sent on a
private email address would similarly establish a rule violation without
inquiry into whether the government employee copied or forwarded the
email within an allotted time frame.161 Mandating official business be
conducted on official instead of private email accounts would create a
presumption among officials that any email involving government
business transmitted on a private email account violates the law.
Policing rule violations under the current rules is much more difficult.
As previously discussed, many emails are likely to go unforwarded and
would thus be impervious to oversight.162 These records, which do not
end up under government control, are beyond the FOIA’s reach.163 Even
records forwarded to an official government email account in accordance
with the rules may be difficult to track down if they are scattered among
many different inboxes.164 This Note’s solution can overcome these
challenges by consolidating email records and bringing them under
government control.165
Of course, it would be impossible to capture every government
communication for later public scrutiny. It has long been recognized that
government actors who prefer secrecy will adapt communication
mediums to protect information from disclosure.166 For instance, a
Department. Josh Voorhees, A Crystal-Clear Explanation of Hillary’s Confusing Email Scandal,
SLATE (Aug. 20, 2015, 8:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/20/
hillary_clinton_email_scandal_explained.html. Since the Clinton email revelation, there have
been more discoveries of government employees using private email, and reports indicate that a
substantial proportion of government employees still use personal email for business and fail to
preserve such emails with little repercussions. Attkisson, supra note 9.
161. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. However, the limited exception
prescribed below would provide immunity in narrowly defined circumstances. See infra note 171.
162. See supra Section III.A.
163. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Subsection IV.A.1.
166. Fenster, supra note 18, at 922, 924 (“When an agency or an individual government
official prefers to protect information from disclosure, then the agency or official is more likely
to produce it in a form, circulate it by a method, and/or maintain or destroy it so that the
information will either fall outside disclosure requirements or avoid detection.”).
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government official who prefers secrecy may choose to communicate
telephonically if he perceives an email would involve a high risk of
disclosure.167 Simply put, perfect information regulation is not possible,
and at some level, disclosure avoidance is inevitable.168 However,
prohibiting official business on private email addresses would make
enforcement more likely, thus increasing the cost of non-compliance.
3. Shrinking the Exception to the General Rule
Any modification to records-retention statutes must provide for the
reality that access to official email accounts may be impractical at times.
A server being down169 and a late-night crisis requiring an immediate
response170 are instances in which transmitting government business on
a private email address would be warranted. Such exceptions to the
general prohibition should be narrowly tailored to prescribe procedures
for these situations, including protocols for preserving these
communications. It must be made clear, though, that use of personal
email is a narrow exception to the general rule that government
employees must use official email accounts for emails involving
government business.171
4. Institutional Oversight
To effect the change sought by this Note’s solution, institutional
measures aimed at ensuring compliance should be taken. Noncompliance
with transparency laws is well documented, and the need for institutional
oversight in this arena is likewise not a novel concept.172 An example of
such an institutional oversight mechanism is the recently created Office
of Government Information Services, which is responsible for counseling
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. GINSBERG, supra note 24, at 6 n.25.
170. Carroll, supra note 130 (“High-level officials . . . need the flexibility to sometimes use
a personal email, such as responding to a national security emergency in the middle of the night.”).
As discussed infra, increased spending on government IT would facilitate more secure and
convenient access to government email accounts. Thus, the increased availability of official
accounts on mobile devices and otherwise should obviate some of the need to use private email
when government employees are away from their work computer.
171. The exception could be simply added by leaving 44 U.S.C. §§ 2209(a) and 2911(a)
intact (i.e., retain the word “unless”) and inserting a subsection (1) stating: “the official electronic
messaging account of the covered employee is practically inaccessible. Any such electronic
message shall be copied or forwarded to an official electronic messaging account not later than
twenty days after the transmission of the original message.”
172. See Maria H. Benecki, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act—1987,
1988 DUKE L.J. 566, 579–80 (describing Congressional hearings and proposals in 1986 and 1987
regarding the introduction of a FOIA Tribunal or Ombudsman).
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agencies on FOIA compliance, suggesting policy changes, and mediating
disputes between requesters and agencies.173 An impartial ombudsman
operating outside the ambit of the regulated agencies would give this
Note’s solution the operational capability to influence email retention.
Assuming a record is preserved, illegitimate concealment of the
record is unlikely, because FOIA administrators generally have no
political stake in disclosure versus nondisclosure; indeed, their interests
may even cut in favor of disclosure.174 Due to their relative impartiality,
FOIA administrators would be more accurate in their categorization of
records than the individuals creating or receiving the email records.
B. Increasing Security
Allowing government employees to transmit government records on
personal email accounts is fraught with risk.175 Bringing all (or, at least,
more) government emails under the protection of government servers
would yield significant security improvements. Given the sensitivity and
importance of information handled by organizations like the Departments
of State and Defense, these risks should be minimized to the greatest
degree possible. The best way to achieve consistent and comprehensive
security of our government’s valuable digital information is to restrict
transmission of official emails to accounts of official networks.
A consistent “security fence” protecting the lot of government emails
is needed to reduce the risks posed by the transmission of official emails
on unprotected servers.176 By neglecting to use a State Department email
address during her tenure, Hillary Clinton ostensibly rejected protection
by the State Department’s IT department and the National Security
Agency.177 Of course, she could have enjoyed similarly sophisticated
defenses with an email address hosted by an email provider like Yahoo
or Gmail,178 but even security provided by Internet companies varies
between providers and cannot guarantee an account will not be hacked.179
The most important security benefit of this Note’s solution is enhanced
consistency of email protection across the spectrum of government
emails.
173. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(h) (2012).
174. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1047–48 (2008) (“Many of the decisions regarding FOIA requests are
made at a line level by career bureaucrats who have no political stake in disclosure or
nondisclosure and who can do their jobs most easily by following regulations in good faith.”).
175. See supra Section III.B.
176. See Greenberg, supra note 137.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Zetter, supra note 142.
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C. Modernizing Information Technology
While enhancing the consistency of officials’ email protections would
be a major security improvement, inadequacies of government IT should
not be ignored. Government agencies have been criticized of late for their
vulnerability to cyber threats and their antiquated IT. Significant
investment is needed to meet these challenges.
In recent years, government agencies have repeatedly been the targets
of successful hacking attacks.180 Notably, hackers recently breached the
State Department’s unclassified email system—one of the very systems
this Note suggests would be preferable to a personal email account.181
Some have even made the case that email accounts hosted by private
Internet companies are less prone to hacks than government email
accounts.182
Inspections of federal agencies’ IT systems confirm the anecdotal
evidence that these systems are deficient. A recent study examining
federal information security found “persistent weaknesses at
agencies . . . demonstrat[ing] the need for improved security.”183 A
separate audit concluded that State Department information-security
protocols did not meet federal requirements.184
Beyond questions of email security, some have complained that
government IT is outdated and inefficient.185 One former federal
employee likened working for the government to “stepping in a time
machine.”186 Moreover, secure mobile phones capable of handling
180. See David Alexander, The OPM Hack Was a Lot Worse than Previously Disclosed,
HUFFPOST POL. (Sept. 23, 2015, 3:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opmhack_5602f64be4b08820d91b59c2; US Centcom Twitter Account Hacked by Pro-IS Group, BBC
(Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30785232.
181. See Nicky Woolf, State Department Email Attack ‘Fits Pattern’ of Russian Hackers,
Says Expert, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2014/nov/17/state-department-email-attack-shutdown. From the State Department’s
perspective, the proverbial silver lining is that it was contained to the Department’s unclassified
email system, and no classified information was stolen. Id.
182. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 16.
183. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-714, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY:
AGENCIES NEED TO CORRECT WEAKNESSES AND FULLY IMPLEMENT SECURITY PROGRAMS 18–23,
54 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672801.pdf.
184. Cory Bennett, State Dept. Cybersecurity Still Lagging, Audit Finds, HILL (Nov. 20,
2015, 3:02 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/260942-state-department-cybersecuritystill-lagging-audit-finds.
185. Klapper et al., supra note 135 (quoting a State Department policy chief’s complaint that
Department technology is “so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high
officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done quickly
and effectively”).
186. Johnson, supra note 16.
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classified information are practically inaccessible.187 Several others have
called for the modernization of government IT.188
Investment aimed at shoring up flimsy digital defenses could
significantly reduce the frequency of successful hacks against the
government and could make official email accounts and servers safer than
private ones.189 The cost of operating the classification system is
estimated at $14.98 billion.190 In light of this enormous expense, the
federal government should prioritize the modernization of IT that could
imperil classified information if neglected further. These improvements
would make compliance with transparency laws easier, enabling more
complete and secure record preservation.
CONCLUSION
The Hillary Clinton email event sheds light on the extensive
shortcomings of current records-retention laws. The conflict of interest
inherent in today’s self-regulation scheme causes a large proportion of
email records to elude preservation. Further, antiquated and inefficient
government IT causes many government employees to opt to use private
email instead of their official accounts, compounding the issue even
further. These emails, which inhabit private email servers, can be
practically immune from oversight and thus circumvent transparency
laws. Beyond that, security measures protecting private servers are often
lacking and can leave sensitive information vulnerable to hacking.
To address the issues associated with government emails on private
accounts, the practice of sending such emails should be prohibited.
Additionally, government IT should be modernized to securely meet the
demands of government employees who are connected to their email
187. Robert O’Harrow Jr., How Clinton’s Email Scandal Took Root, WASH. POST (Mar. 27,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-clintons-email-scandal-took-root/
2016/03/27/ee301168-e162-11e5-846c-10191d1fc4ec_story.html (noting a request by Clinton for
a secure mobile device which was “rebuffed” by the NSA). Due to the vast amounts of
government communications that are classified, being unable to access these documents from
anywhere but a work computer is more than a modest hindrance.
188. Suzanne Nossel, Don’t Blame Hillary for the Classified Email Scandal, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/30/dont-blame-hillary-for-the-classifiedemail-scandal-state-department-servers/ (noting that the State Department did not offer
employees access to cell phones equipped to handle classified emails during Clinton’s term as
Secretary of State); James Reinl, CIA Director Hack by Teen Spotlights US Cyber-Frailty,
ALJAZEERA (Oct. 24, 2015, 1:34 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/ciadirector-hack-teen-spotlights-cyber-frailty-151024123451489.html.
189. Id. (“The US and other cyber-spying governments use their resources looking to exploit
cracks in their rivals’ systems rather than finding and patching their own vulnerabilities. . . . ‘If
all the governments and private sectors around the world invested money and cooperated on
cyber-security and actually provided this as a public good like we do with national security, we
could change the trajectory.’”).
190. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 98, at 23.
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around the clock. These changes will preserve and protect the
government’s emails. To continue without real change is to perpetuate a
faltering system.
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